The Battle of Hastings - The Real Battlefield Location
We first visited Battle Abbey on a school trip for the 900th anniversary. Even as seven and eight-year-olds we could tell that the basic events described to us in the traditional narrative did not match the geography and topology of the place. After searching for most of our adult lives, we think we have found the real battlefield some three miles northeast of Battle Abbey near Sedlescombe.
We published the story of our investigation in a series of blogs. People complained that they were difficult to read as a narrative and difficult to reference. We therefore combined the blogs into a book published on the 950th anniversary of the battle. It is available as webpages, PDF, Kindle, ebook, or in print. The book ISBN is 978-1-5272-4204-3. The Kindle ASIN is B07TBQMMWT. You can download the PDF or the EPUB versions of this book by clicking this link. The web version of our book is split into four sections - links below - but we warn readers in advance that it is long and dry. Hardly anyone reads it all, so we have provided some more concise alternatives.
Battle of Hastings at Sedlescombe - Summary
1. All the action takes place on the Hastings Peninsula (heat relief map above), and nearby. It was a real peninsula in those days, triangular in shape, enclosed by the River Brede to the north, the River Ash Bourne to the west and by the sea to the south. The isthmus (IR) at Sprays Wood (now on the B2096) was barely 500m across. Beyond the rivers were two huge marshy inland lagoons: Romney Marsh to the east, Pevensey Levels to the west. These lagoons were retained by long shingle spits which extended east and west from the Hastings Peninsula. The geography of this place was extraordinary, offering a great chance to trap or ambush a counter-attacking army. We believe this is why William chose it for his invasion.
2. William landed on the north bank of the Brede (1 on the map above), on what is now the Udimore Peninsula. The nearest Saxon garrisons - Lympne and Pevensey - had been emptied to help repel Viking invaders up north, thereby allowing the Normans to land unopposed. William was not to know. He expected a garrison counterattack soon after landing. A major reason for landing on the north bank of the Brede was the pinch point at Sowdens (So), where the Udimore ridge narrowed to barely 100m across. His plan would have been to block the ridgeway at Sowdens, buying time to unload the horses, armour and fortifications. With a strong bridgehead, the Normans could punch through or loop behind a garrison sized force on the Udimore ridge.
3. William had no fear of a garrison counterattack or a garrison blockade against his bridgehead on the Udimore Peninsula, but it was no place to be when the English army arrived. The Sowdens pinch point would turn into a strangulation point for a siege. Harold would have lined the south bank of the Brede with pikemen to fend off a crossing. If he also blockaded the Brede estuary, the Normans would have been trapped on the barren tip of the Udimore Peninsula and would soon have been starved into submission. Hence, William needed to move the Norman army somewhere with more space, more food and better tactical possibilities before the main English army arrived.
4. After just one day, the Normans crossed to the south bank of the Brede. William created a sea camp at modern Winchelsea (2) for himself and his barons. He learned from messengers that Harold was bringing the English army down the Roman road from Rochester (RR13, shown as a black line). He dispersed his cavalry around what was Buckhurst manor (2C), now Great Buckland Farm, where they could guard the Brede crossing at Sedlescombe (S) without being seen from the other side. His Plan A was to appear weak and toothless at modern Winchelsea, in order to lure Harold and the English army across the Brede. His plan would have been to cut off Harold's retreat and ambush him at the river crossing.
5. Harold had no intention of attacking the Normans before his entire army had been assembled. He went to Sussex with an understrength army expecting to negotiate William's return to Normandy. He knew that William might try to ambush him on the way, so he camped on Great Sanders ridge (G), the last high ground before the Brede, while spies and messengers were dispatched to scout the Norman deployment. Harold thought that the Great Sanders ridge was an ideal base from which to conduct negotiations and make plans because it covered all the Hastings Peninsula egress points. In the mistaken belief that the Normans were overwhelmingly footbound, he thought they would not have been able to break through an egress point blockade. Even if they did, his camp was close enough to the Rother for Harold to effect a controlled retreat to safety.
6. Unfortunately for Harold, William had brought 2000 or so trained battle horses and their knights. They could prevent a blockade of the Brede crossing at Sedlescombe, and they could cut off a controlled retreat by cantering to Cripps Corner (CC) and spreading out along the ridge. Harold and the English army were effectively trapped. Harold could not even risk fleeing in person, because he could not be sure that part of the Norman cavalry was not waiting to ambush him at Cripps Corner or on the way through Lordship Wood. Indeed, William had probably placed his best archers and swiftest mounts at Cripps Corner and Lordship Wood to cover just such an eventuality.
7. William knew that Harold was trapped and that no significant English reinforcements would arrive on the Friday. He therefore brought all his forces to a battle camp along what is now Cottage Lane, where they overlooked the English camp. William spent Friday scouting the English positions, then attacked at dawn on Saturday. Great Sanders ridge was too woody for Harold to monitor the battle or to control his forces. When he saw the Normans decamp, he moved the English army off the ridge, onto a narrow treeless spur (x on the heat relief map) between two streams that drained into the Brede. This spur was protected at the front by a hastily made ditch, at the sides by boggy streams and from above by an immense iron ore pit. William could only attack up a narrow and moderately steep slope from the river. He arranged his forces into three narrow columns, which was the only deployment that would work on such a narrow battlefield. The English shield wall was an enclosed loop, with the Normans only able to attack the fortified narrow front. They stood close to zero chance of breaking through the English lines ... without the feigned retreat and ill-discipline among the English troops.