Alternative Battlefield Theories

The traditional battlefield surrounding Battle Abbey is a poor geographic, topographic and military fit for what we are told about the Battle of Hastings in the contemporary accounts. It is not supported by any archaeological or physical evidence. It makes no sense. These inadequacies have led some people to suggest that the battle was fought elsewhere.

Figure 60: Traditional and proposed battlefields: B=Battle Abbey; C=Caldbec Hill; T=Telham Hill; O=Telham Court; W=Wadhurst Lane; H=Hurst Lane

We are among the sceptics. We explain our theory that the battle was fought near Sedlescombe here. Credible arguments have been made for other battlefields. The most established of these are Caldbec Hill whose main proponent is John Grehan, albeit based on an original idea by Jim Bradbury, and Telham Hill whose originator and main proponent is Nick Austin. English Heritage have started to back Time Team’s east slope of Battle Hill theory. Less plausible cases have been made for the chevron shaped ridge at Wadhurst Lane and Old Heathfield in the Weald.

None of these alternative battlefield candidates has unearthed any battle related archaeology. We therefore intend to apply the same process that we used for the traditional battlefield, matching each of them to military, geographic and topographic descriptions from the contemporary accounts, as well as to common sense and to our idea of the leaders’ personal motivations. We will also consider any additional site-specific information that their backers have discovered.

As we say repeatedly, the clues in the contemporary accounts are equivocal or enigmatic. None of the place names survive. Some of the clues seem to be contradictory, most notably whether or not the English were attacked in their camp. Many of the clues use unqualified adjectives like big, narrow, close, near, steep, long, etc, that have a wide range of meanings. Some clues are ambiguous in their original language or in translation. Some of the locational clues are relative to the Norman or English camps, for which there are no confirmed locations. It is no wonder that different historians read the same clues and reach wildly different conclusions.

The easy part is that Caldbec Hill, Telham Hill, Wadhurst Lane and Hugletts are all ridges or spurs. None of them comply with John of Worcester's statement that the battlefield was nine Roman miles from the Norman camp at Heastinga: They are at least two Roman miles too far from our proposed Norman camp at Winchelsea or at least two Roman miles too near to anywhere else the Normans might have camped on the coast.

Woods are an interesting factor in the battle. William’s horses, lances, archers and armour would all be ineffective in dense woodland. Woodland was so ubiquitous in medieval Sussex that Harold would never have been more than a few hundred metres from one. Why then would Harold even consider fighting behind a shield wall? In a battle between a static shield wall against cavalry, infantry and archers, the shield wall cannot win. It can only survive. If Harold's objective was to survive, his best chance would have been to melt away into nearby dense woodland. Moreover, Harold was a medieval aristocrat. Hunting in woods would have been in his blood. We think he would have jumped at the chance to nullify the Normans’ superior armour, weapons and mobility by skirmishing in woodland.

We reject claims that a retreat into woodland would be deemed cowardly. It is true that Saxons and Vikings took pride in shield wall fights. If the English were fighting Vikings or other Saxons, they may well have thought it dishonourable to shy away from a shield wall fight. But, despite their common ancestry, the Normans were neither Saxon nor Viking. They fought behind equine tanks and at distance with arrows and quarrels. The English would have thought them dishonourable cowardly cheats. Any tactic that led to ultimate victory would probably have been deemed honourable.

We can only imagine that the woods near to the battlefield were too small or too thin to provide decent cover. Harold had a manor nearby at Crowhurst. Perhaps he had had the woods thinned and the undergrowth cut back for hunting. The only woodland that could not have been thinned was the Andredsweald, which was too far away to be relevant to the battle scenarios discussed below, bar the least likely, Old Heathfield.

Caldbec Hill, Telham Hill and Wadhurst Lane all rely on impenetrable woodland to force the Normans to attack from a disadvantageous direction or to prevent them outflanking one or both ends of the English shield wall. We are reliably informed by Helen Read, a world-renowned expert on medieval woodland, that mature deciduous woodland is never impenetrable in temperate latitudes because the trees have large canopies that prevent light getting to the ground, thereby stunting saplings and shrubs. Helen pointed out that a lot of medieval woodland was coppiced and that coppices can be impenetrable at the mid-stage of their cycle. But coppices are managed. Foresters need paths to get around. We believe that impenetrable woodland did not play any part in the Battle of Hastings, but we will temporarily forbear to give each of the alternative battlefield theories a chance.

All the alternative battlefield theories feature straight English shield walls. We list eleven clues in the contemporary accounts that suggest the English shield wall was enclosed. We therefore offer an alternative scenario for each alternative theory in which the shield wall is enclosed.

There is another fundamental issue with the three established alternative battlefield candidates, in that they are on the Hastings Peninsula. We explain in our main Sedlescombe Battlefield blog - here - why we are convinced that the battle was fought near the Hastings Peninsula but not on it. We will temporarily shelve this issue as well, to give all the battlefield candidates a reasonable airing.

Wherever the battle was fought, it needed to fit with William and Harold’s motivations and tactics. We talk about these in the main Sedlescombe Battlefield blog. To summarise, William needed to kill Harold and his brothers quickly. He needed to lure Harold and as many brothers as possible, prevent them from fleeing and then kill them all. The longer it took, the bigger the English army, the more attrition to the Norman army and the greater the probability that someone would annex Normandy. We think that this was in Harold’s mind too. Normandy, Anjou, Maine and part of Brittany had been left lightly defended. We think that Harold wanted a quick victory, or at least a quick siege, because he hoped to plunder or annex Normandy before anyone else got a jump on him.

Figure 61: 1770 Yeakell and Gardner hachure map of Sussex

We have updated most of these alternative battlefield theories since the first edition of our book to incorporate evidence from the 1770 Yeakell and Gardner hachure map (Figure 61). It was collated 700 years after the battle. A lot had changed in the meantime. Some combination of glacial rebound and silting lowered the effective sea level by 5m, the Camber and Crumbles shingle spits had been washed away. Pevensey Levels, Combe Haven and much of the Romney Marshes had been inned and silted up. This made the coast almost unrecognisable. Inland is a different story. Inland erosion is a slow process. They lacked the tools and manpower for widespread deforestation. It seems unlikely that they would plant new woodland in a region covered in woodland and short of farmland. We believe that this map provides a good proxy for inland land usage in 1066.

Crowhurst / Telham Hill

Momentous Britain admires the new sign on the Crowhurst Yew

Nick Austin’s Crowhurst battlefield theory has more adherents than all the other alternative battlefields combined. It demands careful consideration. To summarise, he thinks that the Normans landed at Redgeland Wood in Combe Haven (R on Figure 61) and camped nearby (1). The next day they moved 750m northwest, to the top of the hill at Upper Wilting (2). On the day of battle, the English army was heading south on what Austin refers to as the ‘old London road’. The Normans saw them coming and headed north on the same road. As Harold crested Telham Hill, a spur off the Hastings Ridge, he saw the Norman army heading towards him. He set up his shield wall 10m below the spur crest (T), on the steepest part of the south slope of Telham Hill. The Normans passed through Crowhurst (C) and attacked up Telham Hill where they routed the English army and killed Harold.

Figure 62: Nick Austin's battle scenario around Crowhurst

We first heard Nick Austin’s theory when we saw him present “Secrets of the Norman Invasion” (SOTNI) back in the 1990s. His approach was a revelation that we quickly copied. His theory sounded credible and coherent too, but the more we investigated, the more flaws we found in his evidence, and the more we realised that it is based on spurious assumptions. We explain here why we think his landing and Norman camp theory are flawed but we will forbear about this to consider his engagement and battle scenarios.   

Austin's battle scenario

Figure 63: Crowhurst battlefield OS map

Figure 62 sets Austin’s scene at 09:00 on the day of battle with the English at Pye’s Farm (T) and the Normans at Crowhurst (C). Figure 63 shows the English shield wall and the Norman attack on contours. The shield wall would have been roughly 650m long, perhaps 20% shorter (and therefore 20% deeper) than the traditional shield wall at Battle Abbey. Austin says that it was bounded at the sides by impenetrable woodland - Fore Wood to the west and Hunters Gill to the east - forcing the Normans to attack up the slope from Crowhurst.

Figure 64: Yeakell and Gardner map of Telham Hill

Yeakell and Gardner (Figure 64) shows the geography in the 1770s. It is probably a good indication of how the area looked in 1066. Austin’s proposed battlefield would have been virtually treeless with the English shield wall on the shading that depicts the steepest part of the slope. Fore Wood was tight against the west side of Austin’s battlefield. Note that no woodland is depicted on the eastern side of the battlefield, apart from along the base of the gill. It is unlikely to have been removed during the intervening 750 years. A first indication, perhaps, that Austin’s evidence is less than rigorous.

If the battle was fought on the southern slope of Telham Hill, in the circumstances that Austin describes, it would have been horribly difficult for the Normans. The hill would have been steep, slippery and untilled, as described by the contemporary accounts. If Fore Wood and Hunters Gill protected the English flanks, as Austin suggests, his scenario might have led to a battle that lasted all day and only ended thanks to a ruse.

Austin has worked out his battle narrative to fit the traditional battlefield clues (perhaps a third of those we use, listed here). As well as the terrain, he says that: the English Standards were visible from the Norman camp, which fits with Carmen; the English were attacked in their camp, which fits with Poitiers and ASC; the English saw the Normans coming and occupied a nearby hill, which fits with Carmen; the battlefield was overlooked from Telham on the ridge, which fits with Wace; the battlefield was steep, which fits with Poitiers and Carmen; it was steep enough for rolled stones to be deadly, which fits with Malmesbury; Hunters Gill was the Malfosse, which fits with Poitiers and CBA. We reviewed his evidence for these claims.

Austin's supporting evidence

Figure 65: Secrets of the Norman Invasion, wall and ruins in Crowhurst

Austin offers two items of physical evidence to support his battlefield theory. One is the ruins of what he refers to as Crowhurst Abbey, which he thinks was a first attempt to build William’s Abbey, “not far” from the battlefield and somewhat lower down, towards the western slope of the ridge, according to CBA. The other is a low stone wall that he thinks might be a battlefield marker mentioned in CBA. Or, at least, CBA says there was a ‘spinam’ on the battlefield that Eleanor Searle translates as ‘low stone wall’. The wall is under a 2000-year-old yew tree in Crowhurst cemetery, the ruins are behind the house next door – see our photos in Figure 65.

We lost faith upon inspection. Crowhurst Abbey has a gothic arch window, which looks no earlier than 12th century. Austin points out some 11th century features, and he kindly contacted us about some new research showing that it is made of Caen stone. This indicates it was high status, but not that it is pre-12th century. Even if it is, the building is in the wrong place, at the bottom of the southern slope of his battlefield rather than lower down towards the western slope. The wall looks Victorian. Martin White, who owned the property at the time, told us that the medieval wall is thought to be underneath the visible wall. It would be unusual.

Figure 66: View towards Nick Austin's Telham Hill battlefield from summit of Upper Wilting

More problematic, William’s view of Telham Hill from his camp at Upper Wilting is not what Austin claims. Figure 66 shows that view in July 2020. The tiny grey haze in the red circle is the top of a 27m high L7 electricity pylon that is immediately above the centre of Austin’s battlefield. Only the top 5m is visible, and only in perfect weather. The trees that obscure the bottom 22m are at Rackwell Wood, roughly midway. Even if Rackwell Wood did not exist in 1066 - which seems unlikely considering that this was a heavily wooded region – William’s chance of seeing a typical 6m by 1m Royal Standard from Upper Wilting on a day in October would have been close to zero.

Our photo is different from Austin’s of the same view in SOTNI. The foreground trees in his were removed during the construction of the Bexhill Link Road. There is also a 20-year gap and it was taken in a different season. Even so, the middle ground and distance should look similar. He identifies Telham Hill and Hastings Ridge on the horizon, and a white building on the Hastings side of Telham Lane. Confused we think. His treeline is Rackwell Wood and his white building is at Green Street. The weather and resolution are not good enough to see the battlefield pylon on his photo.

Austin’s evidence for a Malfosse at Hunters Gill is a photograph of a dilapidated wooden bridge, which he claims to be on a medieval path to Crowhurst Park along which the English fled. The bridge is not that old, and his argument is self-defeating. If there was a path through Hunters Gill, the woodland would not be impenetrable, so the Normans would have used it to get behind Harold rather than attack up a steep slope.

Hunters Gill does not match any of the major ditches described in the contemporary accounts, full descriptions of which are here. To summarise: one ditch is lateral, to the side of the battlefield, into which the Normans are shield charged during the battle; one is immense, non-fluvial, precipitous and upslope of the battlefield, through which the English fall back; one is a labyrinth of ditches, through which the English flee. The Malfosse, into which many Norman horsemen fell to their death, might have been part of the immense ditch, or it might have been yet another ditch. Hunters Gill is lateral, but in the middle of what is supposed to be impenetrable woodland. If the Normans could be shield charged through it, it was not impenetrable. Hunters Gill is not CBA’s immense ditch or Malfosse either, being fluvial, not upslope, not precipitous and cushioned by ferns at the bottom. Nor is it Poitier’s ‘labyrinth of ditches’, being a stream valley. Quite the reverse of Austin’s claim, the absence of nearby ditches that match any of the contemporary account descriptions is good evidence that the battle did not happen at Telham Hill.

Flanking at Telham Hill

Figure 67: Possible flanking routes; English shield wall shown in magenta

Austin’s battlefield is only steep from the south. The Normans would not have attacked up a horribly difficult hill if there was a way to flank or loop behind the English shield wall to attack from behind and above. Figure 67 depicts their four flanking possibilities: Through Fore Wood (1), through Hunters Gill (2), to Crowhurst Park and then across Hunters Gill (3), or up to and along the Hastings Ridge then out along Telham Hill spur (4). Austin reckons the Normans were unable to use any of these flanking routes because Fore Wood, Hunters Gill and the Hastings Ridge were covered with impenetrable woodland. It seems incredibly unlikely when there is no other impenetrable mature deciduous woodland in the entire northern hemisphere.

We went to verify his claim, starting with his only evidence, some photographs in SOTNI of dense thicket in Hunters Gill. We found that they were taken beside open paths that allow the sun to penetrate - the sky is visible on one of them - so they will develop dense thicket. It is not typical of Fore Wood or Hunters Gill. Both are quite open inside, especially the latter. It took us about an hour to traverse Fore Wood south to north - roughly 1km - without using paths, although we were delayed by a railway and rhododendron groves, which would not have been there to bother the Normans. It took just 30 minutes to traverse Hunters Gill south to north. Even if they were impenetrable in the 11th century, both woodlands are traversed by north-south streams that would have given an express route through the woodland to the crest of Telham Spur for anyone that did not mind getting their feet wet.

We pointed this out to Nick Austin. He replied that it would be impractical to get 6000 men onto the crest of Telham Hill along two streams that were only 1m wide. This may be so, but they could almost certainly have walked 100 abreast through the open woodland, and it would not have been necessary to get the entire Norman army onto the ridge crest anyway. The English had no archers. If the Normans could have got 50 archers on the crest of Telham Hill, they could have shot at Harold from behind and above with impunity. Even if they failed to kill him, the shield wall would have been forced to defend him, thereby allowing the Norman cavalry through the gaps.

Austin’s argument that the Hasting Ridge was blocked by impenetrable woodland in the 11th century is based on a statement in Dawson’s History of Hastings Castle: “there are no evidences of any such thing as a main road to London from Hastings at this early period, or indeed for many years afterwards”. The ‘early period’ being Saxon times. He interprets “many years” to mean seven hundred years. The only evidence for this in SOTNI is a description of the ‘old London road’ (lower case ‘o’ and ‘r’), which he claims to be an early 18th century coach road between Hastings and Battle, thence to Flimwell and London, that passed through Crowhurst, Pye’s Farm, and what is now a public footpath between Telham Hill and the Esso garage in Battle. His argument proceeds that the only likely reason the Hastings to Battle coach road would have passed through Crowhurst is that the Hastings Ridge was blocked. He provides no evidence for this in SOTNI but told us that it is based on Martin White’s discovery of a former coaching inn in Crowhurst. There is a lot of confusion.

Dawson is being misinterpreted. He was trying to say that there was no main road from Hastings to Battle in Saxon times because both towns were uninhabited. They had no need for a road. It is clear from the very next paragraph that Dawson thinks that Saxons used the Hastings Ridge ridgeway: “The artificial highways lay along the crests of the hill-ranges … one of the principal of these tracks, in the neighbourhood of Hastings, ran along the crest of the range between Fairlight and Battle”. There were Saxon settlements at Telham and Baldslow, both on the Hastings Ridge. They must have had traffic along the ridgeway. Westfield, Crowhurst, Wilting and Luet were also in Baldslow hundred. There must have been branches off the ridgeway to get to them. And a Saxon era ridgeway road is described between Battle Abbey and Hechilande (Telham on the ridge) in CBA.

We have no interest in the Hastings Ridge ridgeway after the Conquest, but we will touch on the coach road. The Flimwell to Hastings Turnpike Act (1753) authorised the first coach road in the region. It used the Old London Road between Hastings and Ore, and the Hastings Ridge ridgeway between Ore and Battle. No Acts have ever authorised coaches to run through Crowhurst, and Austin’s is an unlikely route, needing to cross Little Bog, four gloopy tributaries of the Powdermill Stream, a gorge at Hollington Stream and make a vertiginous climb up and over Telham Hill. Local historians George Kiloh and E J Upton told us that it is totally implausible that the Hastings and Battle coach road ever went via Crowhurst. Martin White told us that he thinks his Crowhurst coaching inn was on a spur that joined the Hastings to Flimwell Turnpike near Crowhurst Park on the ridgeway. It sounds like he did not divulge this extra information to Austin, thereby innocently becoming the source of the confusion.

The actual Old London Road ran between modern Hastings and Ore. Austin’s ‘old London road’ (he uses lower case ‘o’ and ‘r’ to differentiate) is his name, based on his theory that the Hastings to Flimwell coach road ran through Crowhurst. It did not. There was no road direct from Crowhurst through Telham Hill to Battle in the 18th century, nor in the 11th century. Therefore, there was no road through Telham Hill. Armies could only travel on roads. So, the English army was never at Telham Hill.

We consulted Helen Reed, an expert in medieval woodlands, about impenetrable woodland. She confirmed that mature deciduous woodland is never impenetrable because the wide tree canopies block light which stunts saplings and the understorey. She pointed out that many Roman era woodlands in Sussex were coppiced for iron smelting charcoal, and that during one phase of their growth cycle, coppiced trees are too dense for passage. But there was little or no Wealden iron production in Saxon times, so no reason for them to make huge coppices.

Even if all Austin’s woodlands were impenetrable, the Normans could still have looped behind the shield wall without using Austin’s path through Hunters Gill. There was a Roman road from Austin’s Norman camp at Upper Wilting to Crowhurst Park and another from Beauport Park to Sedlescombe where it joined the Rochester Roman road. These major bloomeries were just 250m apart, so they were presumably joined in medieval times. The Rochester Roman road intersected all the ridgeways that the English could have used to get to Telham Hill. The Normans simply had to ride to Crowhurst Park, cross the ridgeway, take the Beauport Park road to Sedlescombe, use the Rochester Roman road to get onto the English trail, which they could follow to sneak up behind the English line.

More saliently, perhaps, the south slope of Telham Hill does not fit the new battlefield clues we have found. Austin’s straight shield wall contradicts the 11 clues that suggest it was horseshoe, wedge-shaped or enclosed. The English would not have first seen the Normans appearing over rising ground or march along a hill crest or cross a valley. The Normans would not have first seen the English emerging from woodland. The English would not have been seen deploying in a military column. The battlefield would not have been enclosed. There would be no plain below the shield wall. There is no reason that the fighting might have been more intense in the middle than on the flanks; the opposite is more likely. Harold would not have been visible from the Norman side of the battlefield. The valley below is out of javelin range. Harold and Gyrth would not have risked scouting close enough to the Norman camp to hear their horses.

In summary, there are flaws in all Austin’s battlefield evidence, apart from the steep slope and rough terrain, but this is irrelevant because it would have been trivial to outflank or loop behind an English shield wall on Telham Hill. There are flaws in all Austin’s engagement evidence too, and his battlefield is inconsistent with all but the most general of contemporary account battlefield descriptions.

Enclosed shield wall at Telham Hill

Figure 68: Alternative location of English shield wall, shown in magenta with fosse in red dots

An enclosed shield wall at Telham Hill might be more promising. The obvious location is the top of Telham Hill spur (Figure 68). This alternative deployment would not only have been defensively superior to Austin’s, but would fit the eleven new clues we have found that the shield wall was horseshoe, wedge-shaped or enclosed. It also means that the Normans could have seen the English emerge from woodland where they had camped.

On the other hand, the slope is inconsistent with the contemporary account descriptions, shallow to the southwest and west, level to the northwest and downhill to the northeast. It is only steep to the southeast, which is the one direction from which William would not have attacked. Faced with an enclosed shield wall like that shown on Figure 68, William would have wanted to attack downhill from Hastings Ridge crest to the northeast. The only plausible reason he might not have done is that the English dug a defensive ditch to protect the northwest of the shield wall – red dots on Figure 68 - which seems unlikely in the short time they had available.

An enclosed shield wall on Telham Hill spur matches more battlefield clues, but only because it is enclosed. This would apply anywhere. It mismatches all the other new clues we have found. Of the other clues, it would match Carmen’s clue that the English are first seen emerging from woodland, but becomes inconsistent with the steep slope and the roughness of the terrain.

Summary

As with the traditional battlefield, we have no proof that the battle was not fought on Telham Hill. But Austin’s argument for Hæstingaport in Combe Haven is flawed. If Hæstingaport was not in Combe Haven, the Normans did not land there. If the Normans did not land in Combe Haven, they did not camp there, which gives Harold no reason to go anywhere near Telham Hill. Even if he did, Austin’s battlefield scenario looks far too leaky, with lots of possible ways the Normans could have outflanked or looped behind the English line for a quick victory. There is no plausible way that the battle could have been fought on Telham Hill that fits more than a handful of the most general contemporary account clues, and most of those are the ones we think to have been misinterpreted. Still, if the battle proves not to have been fought where we think at Hurst Lane, Telham Hill is the least unlikely of the alternatives discussed here.

Caldbec Hill

Momentous Britain inspecting the trig point on Caldbec Hill

Caldbec Hill (CH on Figure 69) is, by tradition, where the English camped on the night before the battle. It is a park now. English Heritage have a plaque at the entrance to remind us of its supposed history. John Grehan and Martin Mace think that the Normans attacked this English camp.

Figure 69: East Sussex in 1066 with Roman road (black) ridgeways (white), possible tracks (white dots) and places that are relevant to the battlefield candidates

Grehan explains in his introduction that he and Mace attended the Battle of Hastings re-enactment one year, being struck by how easily the ‘Norman’ infantry and cavalry were able to climb the slope south of Battle Abbey. Then they walked to the traditional English camp at Caldbec Hill and realised that they could not think of any plausible reason why Harold would abandon such an excellent defensive position for the much inferior position at Battle.

Grehan’s theory about a Caldbec Hill battlefield depends on it being the English camp. His evidence for this is culled from Colonel Lemmon and William Seymour:

  1. Harold came south on the Rochester Roman road which met the Brede at Sedlescombe. Grehan reckons that the Brede was estuarine at Sedlescombe, 200m wide and only traversable by ferry. Harold therefore diverted west on an ancient trackway that crossed the fluvial Brede at Whatlington ford, then continued to Caldbec Hill.
  2. Caldbec Hill was at the junction of three ancient trackways whence Harold’s men would arrive from different parts of the country.
  3. Caldbec Hill blocked the only way that the invaders could leave the Hastings Peninsula.
  4. Caldbec Hill was at the junction of three hundreds, a feature that was sometimes marked by an apple tree, and which therefore might be the ‘hoar apple tree’ that was Harold’s destination in Sussex according to Whitlock’s translation of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle.
  5. Caldbec Hill was just beyond the southern boundary of the Andredsweald, and therefore the only place that fits Poitier’s statement that the English: “were camped on a hill near to the forest through which they had come”.

Unfortunately, all Grehan’s evidence that the English camped at Caldbec Hill is faulty. Most crucially, it is confused about the Brede’s tidal limit. The road north of Sedlescombe Bridge (S on Figure 69) is named ‘The Street’, which is almost invariably associated with former Roman roads. The manor south of Sedlescombe bridge was named Wickham – see Figure 30 – which almost always referred to a settlement beside a Roman road. Roman roads near the coast crossed rivers as close as possible to their tidal limit. The fluvial Brede above the head of tide would have been much the same as it is now, perhaps 2m across. If it did not already have a bridge, it would have been trivial to span the fluvial Brede with a few planks.

The Rochester Roman road and Brede crossing at Sedlescombe provided the most important access and egress to and from the Hastings Peninsula, it was the only crossing that could take heavy freight and the only crossing likely to be used by armies. So, Grehan’s first three points are incorrect. Harold would not have been diverted to Whatlington, Caldbec Hill was not at the junction of major routes, and it did not block egress from the Hastings Peninsula. Moreover, as we say repeatedly above, it is incredibly unlikely that Harold took the English army onto the Hastings Peninsula, and if he did, there is no reason he would have taken them within three miles of Caldbec Hill.

ASC-D (Whitelock) says that Harold: “assembled a large army and came against him at haran apuldran”. Whitelock’s translation of haran apuldran as ‘hoary apple tree’ might be valid but there are more likely alternative meanings, as we describe here. In our opinion, haran apuldran meant ‘boundary of Appledore’, ‘estuary of Appledore’ or ‘anchorage of Appledore’, all of which would be referring to where the Rochester Roman road crosses the Rother estuary, near Bodiam. It cannot mean anything to do with apple trees anyway. Grehan himself says that there are 14 other known apple trees that were used as local hundred markers, which means that there might have been hundreds of them. How would the reader be expected to know which apple tree it was referring to?

Grehan thinks that the Andredsweald stretched down to Caldbec Hill, protecting the English rear. This cannot be right. Yeakell & Gardner (Figure 72) show no trees within 1km of Caldbec Hill, which suggests it was treeless in the 11th century too. The Andredsweald was too dense for meadowland or ploughland, yet Petley Wood, Beech Wood and Duniford Wood were north of Caldbec Hill, and farmland manors were beyond them. Indeed, a line of farmland manors stretched from Ashburnham to Robertsbridge, with almost no manors for thirty miles to their north. They must mark the southern boundary of the Andredsweald. Simon Mansfield used an analysis of places with ‘herste’ in their name – i.e. woodland clearings, and therefore likely settlements - to reach the same result. If this is right, the Andredsweald did not come within 5km of Caldbec Hill, so it is inconsistent with Poitiers’ statement that the English: “were camped on a hill near to the forest through which they had come”. Grehan takes the translation too literally anyway. The original Latin, ‘montem silvæ’, can mean any sort of hilly wood. The English would have been near to a hilly wood through which they had come almost anywhere they decided to camp, apart from at Caldbec Hill.

In our opinion, there is no plausible way that the English camped on Caldbec Hill. If it was not the English camp, Grehan’s reasons to think it was the battlefield theory are also faulty.

Still, Caldbec Hill has long been associated with the battle. It is feasible that the English ended up defending it even though it was not their camp. It is worth persevering with Grehan’s Caldbec Hill battlefield evidence. We can return to ponder how the English might have ended up defending it if it matches the majority of the contemporary account battlefield clues.

Like everyone with an alternative battlefield theory, Grehan lists some reasons – just a few of those we list in our Traditional Battlefield blog here - why Battle Ridge would have been a defensively poor location and why its topography does not match the contemporary account battlefield descriptions. He goes on to suggest how Caldbec Hill would be a better battlefield in both respects:

  1. Caldbec Hill is roughly conical, which would allow Harold to deploy all his men on rising ground.
  2. Caldbec Hill is relatively high and relatively steep sided, matching descriptions in the most trusted contemporary accounts.
  3. The sides of Caldbec Hill were rough, perhaps rugged and uncultivated, matching Carmen’s description.
  4. There are several small water courses at the base of Caldbec Hill, one of which might be that depicted on Tapestry Panel 53.
  5. Caldbec Hill is adjacent to Oakwood Ghyll which is the traditional location of the Malfosse, and CBA says it is “where the fighting was going on”.
  6. Caldbec Hill is visible from Telham Hill (albeit marginal at over 2 miles), where CBA suggests that the Normans dressed for battle, which is consistent with Carmen which says that the English standards are visible from the Norman battle camp.
  7. The summit of Caldbec Hill is known as Mountjoy, the English translation of Mont-joie, the name given to some places where Normans enjoyed military victories.

Grehan is right that Caldbec Hill is adjacent to the traditional Malfosse, but it has been misplaced. The only fluvial ditch described in the contemporary accounts, as we explain here, is the one into which the Normans are shield charged, but Oakwood Ghyll is behind Grehan’s shield wall in the opposite direction to anywhere that the Normans could have been shield charged. Grehan’s other evidence does match a few of the more general traditional contemporary account battlefield clues. Unfortunately, as we explain on here, we think that most of those that are consistent with Caldbec Hill have been misinterpreted.

Figure 70: Caldbec Hill battlefield deployment; after Grehan and Mace

Grehan and Mace depict a battlefield deployment diagram in their book. Their deployments are superimposed on the contours, so it is difficult to see what is going on. Figure 70 shows our reproduction with the contours on top. They left a gap between the northeast ridgeway (yellow line) and the woodland (bottle green). We guess it was a mistake, so we filled it in. Our extension stretches the shield wall out to 1250m, which leaves it precariously thin, but this must be better than allowing the Norman cavalry to ride unhindered through a yawning gap in the defence.

Like everyone with an alternative battlefield theory, Grehan lists some reasons – just a few of those we list on page 175 - why Battle Ridge would have been a defensively poor location and why its topography does not match the contemporary account battlefield descriptions. He goes on to suggest how Caldbec Hill would be a better battlefield in both respects:

  1. Caldbec Hill is relatively high and relatively steep sided, matching descriptions in the most trusted contemporary accounts.
  2. Caldbec Hill is roughly conical, which would allow Harold to deploy all his men on rising ground.
  3. The sides of Caldbec Hill were rough, perhaps rugged and uncultivated, matching Carmen’s description.
  4. There are several small water courses at the base of Caldbec Hill, one of which might be that depicted on Tapestry Panel 53.
  5. Caldbec Hill is adjacent to Oakwood Ghyll, the traditional location of the Malfosse which was adjacent to the battlefield according to CBA.
  6. Caldbec Hill is visible from Telham Hill, where CBA suggests that the Normans dressed for battle, which is consistent with Carmen which says that the English standards are visible from the Norman battle camp.
  7. The summit of Caldbec Hill was known as Mountjoy, the English translation of Mont-joie, a name given to some places where Normans enjoyed military victories.

 

These points are worth further investigation.

  1. Caldbec Hill is relatively steep and relatively high, although we think the contemporary accounts that imply the battlefield was high have been misinterpreted.
  2. Caldbec Hill is roughly conical, but it has a flat top. Grehan had to choose between leaving a long gap in an open shield wall on the steepest part of the hill or forming an enclosed shield wall closer to the summit where the slope is shallower. We will return to this below.
  3. There is no reason to believe that the sides of Caldbec Hill were rough or uncultivated. His theory presumes that the Andredsweald used to abut Caldbec Hill, but it did not.
  4. Panel 53 depicts a water filled ditch behind a low barricade that was immediately adjacent to the battlefield on the route that the Normans used to attack. Wace says that a low barricade protected one side of the shield wall, so it must have been close. The water courses below Caldbec Hill were over 1km from the battlefield, and not on any course the Normans would have used.
  5. Caldbec Hill is adjacent to the traditional Malfosse at Oakwood Ghyll, but Oakwood Ghyll is fluvial and open whereas the Malfosse description in CBA clearly implies that it was non-fluvial and hidden.
  6. Telham Hill is nearly two miles from Caldbec Hill, and there is woodland in between. They would only be visible to each other if the trees had been cut down, and then at such a great distance that there would be no clear features.
  7. True, but it could just mean that the battle was fought in the vicinity.

One major issue with Grehan’s theory, shown in Figure 70, is that he follows the standard practice of assuming that William would attack whatever shield wall was presented to him, no matter how preferable his alternatives. Caldbec Hill is at the junction of the Hastings Ridge and the Isthmus Ridge. Like all ridges on the Hastings Peninsula, it would have had shallow dry slopes on its ridge crests (Figure 71). Those crests probably had ancient ridgeway tracks. If the English were deployed as in Figure 70, there is no plausible reason why William would attack up the southeast slope of Caldbec Hill. He would clearly have attacked along the shallow dry ridge crests to the northeast, south and southwest.

Figure 71: Caldbec Hill Relief - CH = Caldbec Hill; x = Battle Abbey

Another is that Grehan’s troop deployment contradicts one of the few statements about the battle that is agreed by multiple independent primary sources: That William placed himself and his elite Norman troops in the middle division, where the fighting would be most intense. Grehan and Mace’s theory has the middle division on the steepest slope, where the fighting would have been least intense. The intense fighting would have been on the Norman left flank, attacking on the shallow slopes to the west and south.

Battlefield ditches are another problem (see page 142). To summarise: one battlefield ditch is lateral, to the side of the battlefield, into which the Normans are shield charged during the battle; one, CBA’s Malfosse, is adjacent to and upslope of the battlefield, over which the English fall back; one is a labyrinth of ditches, through which the English flee. Oakwood Ghyll does not match any of them, and there are no significant non-fluvial ditches within 1km of the Caldbec Hill.

Time Team reckon that Caldbec Hill is too big to have been defended by an English army of 6000 to 8000 men, the best estimate of its size. Grehan addresses this issue by protecting the northwest side of the hill with impenetrable woodland, thereby reducing the length of the shield wall from in implausible 2000m to a just about plausible 1250m. But, as we have often said, there is no such thing as impenetrable mature deciduous woodland in temperate latitudes. Moreover, Yeakell and Gardner show Caldbec Hill was treeless in the 18th century (Figure 72). It seems unlikely that it would have been de-wooded in the intervening 700 years, because lack of running water would make poor farmland. The Normans would have slipped through the gap and would have killed Harold before the battle even got started. Therefore, Grehan’s proposed shield wall is not plausible. We will return an enclosed shield wall below.

Figure 72: Yeakell and Gardner Caldbec Hill

Caldbec Hill is a poor fit to the other battlefield clues too, including nearly all the new clues we have found. It is not overlooked. It is not beside a plain. It was not near anywhere named Herste. A fosse would not have enclosed the battlefield. It is not steep enough for rolled stones to be dangerous on any slope the Normans might have used to attack. It would have been easy to surround. The Normans would not be first seen appearing over rising ground. They would not have crossed a valley. The valley below is not within javelin throwing range. There is no reason the English would deploy as an infantry column. The English would not be seen emerging from woodland.

Finally, Time Team metal detected the summit of Caldbec Hill for the TV special. They failed to unearth any finds. It was not just that they did not make any battle related finds, but they did not make any finds at all, as if the land had never been occupied, making it an unlikely camp or battlefield.

In one way or another, William would have got troops behind Grehan shield wall within an hour or two. If they did not outflank the defence via the woodland, they would have employed an oblique order attack to break through somewhere else because the defensive line was so thin. We guess that Grehan knows. When Time Team presented him with their alternative theory, he made no attempt to defend his own. He meekly accepted theirs, even though it was clearly invented at the last moment to compensate viewers for having not seen an iota of proper evidence. If Grehan had more confidence in Time Team’s joke theory than his own, we can be fairly sure that his own was unsound.

Enclosed loop shield wall at Caldbec Hill

We list eleven clues that the English shield wall was enclosed. Grehan’s shield wall on the 90m contour is already precariously even with its 600m gap. But the entire shield wall could be enclosed further up the slope, on the 100m contour (Figure 73). It cannot be any shorter than 1250m because Caldbec Hill has a flattish top. If it was equal depth all around, it would be only five ranks deep, but the slopes northwest and southeast are steep enough for the shield wall to be narrower, perhaps.

Several contemporary accounts explain that the Normans attacked in three divisions controlled by William’s voice and hand signals, so they all attacked from the same direction. Wace says that the English protected one side of the battlefield with a barricade and fosse. Perhaps, it protected the firm dry ridgeway to the northwest (red line in Figure 73), at least enough to persuade William to concentrate his attack elsewhere.

Figure 73: Enclosed shield wall on Caldbec Hill

This scenario could lead to a stalemate battle. The main contact point to the south and west would be only 300m long. Harold had enough men to defend that part of the shield wall 10 deep and still have enough men to be three-deep elsewhere. Despite the shallow slope, the narrowness would have made the fight difficult for the Normans. At any one time they could only engage perhaps 300 infantrymen in the fight. They had no chance of breaching a determined defensive line. Doubtless the Normans would have probed the other defences, not least to prevent English reinforcements getting to the main combat point, but the terrain would have made it difficult. It is plausible that the fight lasted all day and only ended thanks to a ruse.

This scenario is a slightly better match for the contemporary account battlefield descriptions too, in that the English deployment would appear to be narrow from the Norman perspective. Clearly, it also matches the 11 clues that the English shield wall was enclosed.

On the other hand, it is still a poor match for the huge majority of battlefield clues (listed here), it contradicts one of the few unambiguous clues, in that the Norman approach and the fighting would not be on uncultivated rugged steep slopes, and it does nothing to explain why Harold would have gone to Caldbec Hill, let alone defend it to the death. It is not the battle being described in the contemporary accounts.

Open shield wall or enclosed, much as we say about the traditional battlefield, Caldbec Hill fits some of the general primary source descriptions, but none of the more specific and enigmatic. It just seems to be a random hill in a landscape covered in random hills. It cannot be discounted as the battlefield, but it seems to us the least likely of the genuine candidates.

Time Team & English Heritage

Figure 74: Momentous Britain examines Tony Robinson's bench at Battle

Thanks to the power of television, the best-known alternative battlefield theory is Time Team's, from their 2003 Battle of Hastings TV show. Tony Robinson (sitting on the bench in Upper Lake, Figure 74) concludes that the battle probably did happen on Battle Hill, only with the Normans attacking along the ridge crest from the east rather than up soggy fields from the south.

We are reliably informed by one of the producers that Time Team did not take their theory seriously, but thought they needed to say something positive because the entire dig made no finds, no advances and no useful discoveries. We were therefore surprised to read an interview conducted by Roy Porter, English Heritage's Head of Property, with The Guardian: “The one place we know the armies weren't is the low ground below the abbey, where most visitors understandably think the battle must have been fought." Then, the Guardian reporter, presumably prompted by Porter, says that the view from the gatehouse roof shows the: "high ground towards Hastings from which William’s army marched". It sounds like English Heritage have accepted Time Team's theory. The Sussex Country Archaeologist had previously told us (in private) that this is his personal view too.

Figure 75:  Time Team battlefield deployment

It is difficult to see the point of Time Team’s theory. Figure 75 is our interpretation of the traditional English battlefield deployment, only with the Normans attacking from the east. Tony Robinson’s bench is under the head of the middle arrow. The Norman attack would come along modern Marley Lane from the east. In other words, Time Team’s battle scenario is the same as the traditional battle scenario, only with the entire Norman army compressed into the traditional right flank. The English shield wall would still have to stretch between the two stream heads. There would still need to be an implausible natural barrier that prevented the Norman cavalry riding around the open ends of the English line.

Exactly as Time Team suggest, a ridge crest attack makes more military sense than the traditional attack. The Normans would be on better ground and would not be fighting up any noticeable hill. Harold would be forced to concentrate his elite huscarls at the east end of the line, making the other flank even more susceptible to an oblique order attack. The battle would have been over in 30 minutes. But the contemporary accounts say that the battle lasted most of the day. It is totally implausible that the Normans would spend all day attacking the best defended part of the English line, when they could canter up to the weak end and break through in minutes.

The orthodox battlefield was already a poor match for the contemporary account battlefield and engagement descriptions. A Norman attack along the ridge crest would contradict those few clues it did match. It would no longer be overlooked by Telham Hill, the English would no longer first see the Normans cresting a hill and crossing a valley, there would no longer be a plain below either of the Norman flanks, the battlefield would no longer be on a steepish slope. We list 36 clues about the battlefield and deployments from the contemporary accounts. Time Team’s theory does not match a single one.

Time Team’s theory would mean that the battle’s killing zone was under the modern town. As the Guardian says: “To add to the confusion, the annual recreation of the battle by costumed re-enactors, which will be fought with increased fervour in October, is held in the wrong place, since the town and the abbey ruins occupy the true site.”  We have a sneaking suspicion that English Heritage might be thinking that Time Team’s joke theory absolves them of any responsibility to find archaeological evidence of the battle on the traditional battlefield. Time Team’s theory is less likely than the orthodox battle theory, and the chances of that being right are negligible.

Wadhurst Lane / Beech Farm

Momentous Britain in a gale at Beech Farm

Through to the late 1990s, we still accepted the traditional view that the English army camped on Caldbec Hill. Wace says that the Norman fleet steered towards a port. He implies that they passed through the port to land upstream of it. We speculated that they steered towards pefenes ea, then passed it to land in the Ash Bourne estuary. If they landed there, they would have camped on Standard Hill, a mile south of the western end of the Isthmus Ridge. Caldbec Hill is at the eastern end of the Isthmus Ridge.

Figure 76: Hastings Peninsula isthmus topography

If the Normans camped at Standard Hill and the English camped at Caldbec Hill, we speculated that the battle might have played out as tradition suggests, only rotated 90 degrees clockwise onto the Isthmus Ridge instead of the Hastings Ridge. In other words, the English were heading west along the Isthmus Ridge to attack the Norman camp on Standard Hill, when they ran into the Normans heading the other way. As in the traditional scenario, and as Carmen specifically says, we thought the English might then have occupied a nearby hill where they set up their shield wall.

The two candidates are High Wood hill on the B2096 and Wadhurst Lane, both of which are roughly a mile north of the Isthmus Ridge. High Wood hill is higher and steeper but, as its name suggests, it is ancient dense woodland. The battle described in the primary sources could not have happened in woodland, let alone such dense woodland as High Wood. We concentrated on Wadhurst Lane.

Figure 77: Simon Coleman's proposed battlefield at Beech Farm

Wadhurst Lane follows the north-south leg of a chevron shaped ridge (Figure 76). He east-west leg crosses Beech Farm. We investigated several places along the ridge where the battle might plausibly have happened, before abandoning the location when we realised that the Normans almost certainly did not land in the Pevensey lagoon. Simon Coleman took up the baton, proposing that the Normans attacked a shield wall across modern Beech Farm (Figure 77).

One major issues we had with Coleman’s theory is that Yeakell & Gardner (Figure 78) show that Beech Farm was covered by woodland in the 18th century. If it was covered by woodland in the 18th century, it was almost certainly covered by woodland in the 11th century, which makes it implausible as a battlefield

Figure 78: Yeakell and Gardner 1770 map of Beech Farm

In the first editions of this book, we dedicate a section to other reasons we believe Coleman’s Beech Farm theory is implausible. We note that he has now abandoned the theory, so we have redacted our comments. He is instead backing Dr Welchman’s Old Heathfield battlefield theory.

Old Heathfield

Momentous Britain investigates Hugletts Farm / Sky Farm near Old Heathfield

Dr Rebecca Welchman thinks the battle was fought near Old Heathfield, some ten miles northwest of Battle. Her theory is incomplete but has enough flesh for us to comment.

Figure 79: Old Heathfield & Dallington in 1066

Welchman’s theory is based on two clues that have not previously been considered. First, a dozen or more 18th century references that state the Battle of Hastings was fought at ‘Heathfield’. Second, she has found a place named ‘Horeapeltre Common’ near Heathfield that is referenced in a 14th century charter. ASC-D says that Harold: “assembles a large army and goes to meet him at haran apuldran”. Whitelock translates haran apuldran as ‘hoary apple tree’. Horeapeltre sounds like a Middle English version of ‘hoary apple tree’. In other words, Dr Welchman speculates that Harold went to meet William at ‘Horeapeltre Common’ near Heathfield, so the battlefield must be nearby.

Modern Heathfield is a mile away from the original settlement, on the other side of Heathfield Park. The pre-20th century Heathfield is now known as Old Heathfield. She proposes the battlefield was 1km to its northeast, at 50.96465, 0.29663, between Sky Farm and Hugletts Farm.

The obvious major departure from all the other battlefield theories is that Heathfield is a long way from the Hastings Peninsula. A consensus of contemporary accounts say that the battle started at the third hour of the day. There is no way that the Normans could have marched 15 miles or more from their ‘Sea Camp’ to Old Heathfield to start the battle at the third hour of the day. Welchman therefore proposes that the Normans had previously moved to a battle camp at Dallington, 3½ miles east of Sky Farm.

We too think that the battle was not fought on the Hastings Peninsula but nearby. There is a list of reasons above, some of which would apply to Old Heathfield. We disagree with the rest of her theory.

Carmen says that the English Standards were visible from the Norman battle camp. Hugletts Farm was in the Andredsweald, surrounded by dense mature woodland. The English Standards would need to have been on 40m poles to have been visible from the trig point at Dallington. It was also 3½ miles away. Even if there was nothing between, there is no chance that William could have seen a typical 6m by 1m Royal Standard from the Norman camp. Worse, Brevis Relatio says that a Norman soldier standing with William in the Norman battle camp thinks Harold is: “in the midst of the dense array, which was before them on the top of the hill, for he thinks he can see Harold’s Standard there”. If there was no way that the English Standards could be visible from Dallington, there is absolutely no way that Harold and the English troop formation could have been visible.

CBA says that the Normans dress for battle at Hechelande, which it repeatedly says was adjacent to Telham. But the Normans would surely not have moved 12km in the wrong direction to dress for battle, and if they did, they could not have made it back to Old Heathfield before lunchtime.

More fundamentally, we do not believe that the ASC was trying to say that Harold went to meet William at ‘the hoary apple tree’. Welchman is sceptical too, so she translates haran apuldran as ‘hoary pollard tree’. It is no better as far as we are concerned. It would be a single tree in a dense forest of 7000 square miles. Harold’s men would have no chance of finding it. ASC readers would have no idea where it was. Whatever the ASC meant by haran – estuary, anchorage and boundary are all plausible – we think apuldran must have referred to a nationally well-known place, perhaps a royal hunting park or, more likely we think, Appledore.

Even if haran apuldran did refer to a hoary apple/pollard tree, we doubt it was at Horeapeltre Common. The charter in which it is first mentioned is dated 1338 (Welchman thinks 150 years earlier but does not explain why), which is an awful long time after the battle. A few Saxon coins have been found 5 miles away but there is no evidence of Saxon occupation near Old Heathfield. It seems likely to us that Horeapeltre Common was created during the 13th century clearing and settlement of the Andredsweald. If there was no Saxon occupation, there is no reason for it to have had a name at the time of the battle. Welchman talks a lot about the LIN 129 and LIN 131 ridgeways that pass nearby, but there is no evidence they were being widely used in Saxon times and we think it unlikely.

Even if a proto Horeapeltre Common did exist in Saxon times, we are sceptical that Harold would have used LIN 129 and LIN 130 to cross the Andredsweald, for reasons we explain elsewhere. Welchman notes that the Andredsweald trackways would offer the best opportunity for Harold to catch William with a suprise attack, which is true but mute, because they had been exchanging messages/insults over the preceding days, and scouting each other’s camp according to Poitiers, Carmen and Wace.

Welchman’s battlefield at Hugletts/Sky Farm is an ‘L’ shaped hill with three peaks at the corner and ends of the ‘L’. Each individual peak is too small to accommodate an army of 1000, let alone the likely figure of 6000 plus followers. The hill-top encompassing all three peaks is 1500m around, double the length of the traditional shield wall at Battle, which would spread the English line precariously thin. If they tried to encompass either pair of peaks, the Normans would have had a level slope to use for their attack, which would contradict most of the contemporary accounts.

Even if all this were not so, we are convinced that the link between the battlefield and Heathfield is spurious. The first reference is in Aubry de La Mottraye’s book ‘Travels Through Europe, Asia and into Part of Africa’ published in 1723. He says that he investigated the battle while he was stuck in Hastings for a few days when his ship was delayed. In his account, he says: “They generally call that the Battle of Hastings, in which he gained the Crown, though it was fought some 6 or 7 miles distant to the NE, upon a Plain called Heathfield.” Welchman thinks that La Mottraye read this, or heard about it, from an unknown contemporary battle account that has subsequently disappeared. It seems implausible to us.

La Mottraye was only in Hastings for a few days. The probability that he found a previously unknown account that immediately and permanently re-disappeared seems negligible. A more credible origin is that he made a misleading deduction from the Chronicle of Battle Abbey. CBA says that the Normans attacked from a place named Hechelande, which it reports to have been an area between Telham and Battle Abbey. It then claims that Battle Abbey was built where Harold died. The fighting would have been at the English shield wall, somewhere between Harold – and therefore Battle Abbey - and whence the Norman attacked. It would be perfectly logical, therefore, to deduce that the battlefield was named Hechelande. La Mottraye’s book was in modern English, so we think he translated Hechelande to Heathfield, not intending it to mean Heathfield near Broad Oak or any other named place.

The rest is straightforward. La Mottraye’s Travels was the first battle account written in a modern language. All the other reports of the battle being fought at Heathfield were in popular press books and magazines, most notably in Daniel Defoe’s ‘Tour thru the whole island of Great Britain’. We think they all used La Mottray’s Travels as their source, probably because their authors could not read Latin, Old French or Old English. No academic accounts suggested the battle was fought at Heathfield, presumably because academics could read Latin. No new reports of a battlefield near Heathfield were published after 1820, we think because this was when Lower published his English CBA translation. We presume that subsequent popular press articles used Lower’s translation as their source and the authors realised that CBA is not suggesting the battle was fought near Heathfield in the Weald.

None of the authors of the 18th century references cite their source but we are confident that most of them did not mean Heathfield in the Weald because they say that it was 6 to 7 miles from Hastings. This would be accurate for the distance to Hechelande but not the 15 miles to Old Heathfield. The only exception is Brice (and Luckcombe, whose narrative is based on Brice) who specifically says that the battle was fought at Heathfield in the Weald. We guess he got confused.

Taking a step back, we cannot believe that William would be naïve enough to be drawn into a woodland battle. Welchman says that Old Heathland was on the edge of the Andredsweald, and therefore not in woodland, but it seems implausible to us. It was not a Domesday manor. No medieval finds have been registered within five miles. There are no Domesday manors with more than a handful of occupants within five miles. We are convinced that Old Heathfield was in the heart of the Andredsweald. If the English army was at Old Heathfield, as soon as they saw the Normans coming, they would have melted away into dense woodland where the Norman horses, armour and archers would lose their advantage. Harold would have moved to safety. The English would have blocked the ridgeway back to the Hastings Peninsula. The Normans would be trapped in unknown woodland with no food. The invasion would have failed.

In summary, Welchman’s theory is based on her interpretation of two new clues, neither of which is convincing. Stripped of that evidence, the rest of her theory is weak. Dr Welchman’s narrative is just about plausible but, in our opinion, not credible.